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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 09-4542 
_____________ 
 
MICHELE M. SIMMSPARRIS,  
 
                       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP.;  
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS 
_____________ 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02434) 
District Judge:  Hon. Katharine S. Hayden 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 19, 2010 
 
Before:  BARRY, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed:  July 28, 2011) 
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_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Michele SimmsParris brought this action under the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1681x, to recover for the reporting of what she asserts was 
false information about her mortgage repayments.  The 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
determining that SimmsParris had not properly presented her 
claim as required by the FCRA, granted summary judgment 
against her.  SimmsParris now appeals, and, for the reasons 
set forth below, we will affirm. 
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I. 
A. 
 SimmsParris obtained a mortgage loan from 
Countrywide Home Loans (“CHL”) on February 22, 2007.  
CHL maintains that, although SimmsParris‟s payments were 
due on the first of each month, her December 2007 payment 
was not received until December 31, and her January 2008 
payment was not received until January 25.  CHL states that, 
as a part of “common business practice,” it “reports the status 
of its entire active loan portfolio to Experian, Equifax, 
Transunion and Innovis every month,” and it followed this 
practice by reporting that SimmsParris‟s payments were not 
timely received.  Joint Appendix (“JA”) 1266.  In February of 
2008, SimmsParris learned that CHL had furnished 
information to credit reporting agencies that her December 
2007 and January 2008 mortgage payments were late.  She 
immediately had the law firm in which she was a partner draft 
a letter to CHL and its parent company, Countrywide 
Financial Corp. (“CFC”), to inform them that CHL had 
furnished false information.  Even after SimmsParris reported 
this alleged error to CFC and CHL, they did not alter the 
information that they provided and continued to report that 
her payments had been delinquent.       
 
B. 
 
 SimmsParris filed suit in the District of New Jersey on 
May 19, 2008, seeking to recover for defamation, false light 
invasion of privacy, breach of contract, negligence, negligent 
supervision, conversion, fraud, and violations of the FCRA.  
She also sought and received a temporary restraining order 
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that enjoined CHL from reporting false information to third 
parties regarding SimmsParris‟s loan payments.  CHL and 
CFC filed a motion to dismiss on June 25, 2008, contending 
that the FCRA preempted SimmsParris‟s claims, and later 
filed a motion for summary judgment on March 27, 2009.  
The District Court denied the motion to dismiss on March 31, 
2009, stating that the motion was superseded by the motion 
for summary judgment, and denied the motion for summary 
judgment on April 3 for failing to comply with the local rule 
on page limitations.   
 
CHL and CFC filed a second motion for summary 
judgment on April 9, 2009, and the District Court held oral 
argument on this motion on October 22, 2009.  Following this 
hearing, the District Court granted summary judgment in the 
defendants‟ favor.  In doing so, the District Court concluded 
that a private litigant seeking to recover against the furnisher 
of information under the FCRA must first make a complaint 
to a consumer reporting agency before the furnisher of 
information can face liability under the statute.  Although the 
District Court granted summary judgment on all of 
SimmsParris‟s claims, it did not address the reasons for doing 
so in respect to her state law claims. 
 
 SimmsParris filed a timely notice of appeal and 
contests the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment only 
as to her FCRA claim.  
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332 and this Court has 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the 
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District Court‟s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  
Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005).  
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). 
 
III. 
 
The FCRA is intended “to protect consumers from the 
transmission of inaccurate information about them, and to 
establish credit reporting practices that utilize accurate, 
relevant, and current information in a confidential and 
responsible manner.”  Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 
688, 706 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).  The 
FCRA places certain duties on those who furnish information 
to consumer reporting agencies.  Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-
2(a), for instance, the furnisher of information has a duty to 
provide accurate information.  Additionally, 15 U.S.C. § 
1681s-2(b) imposes a duty to conduct an investigation into 
the completeness and accuracy of the information furnished 
in certain circumstances.  See id. at 714 (“a consumer must 
first inform the credit agency that s/he disputes the 
information,” after which “[t]he credit reporting agency must 
reinvestigate promptly based on that dispute”).  
 
The FCRA also has several provisions that create 
liability for violations of the Act.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 
1681n (creating civil liability for willful noncompliance with 
any portion of the Act); id. § 1681o (creating civil liability for 
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negligent noncompliance with any portion of the Act).
1
  
These provisions, however, cannot be used by a private 
individual to assert a claim for a violation of § 1681s-2(a), as 
such claims are available only to the Government.  Id. § 
1681s-2(c) (“[S]ections 1681n and 1681o of this title do not 
apply to any violation of – (1) subsection (a) of this section . . 
. .”); id. § 1681s-2(d) (“The provisions of law described in 
paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (c) of this section . . . 
shall be enforced exclusively . . . by the Federal agencies and 
officials and the State officials identified in section 1681s of 
this title.”).  This leaves 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) as the only 
section that can be enforced by a private citizen seeking to 
recover damages caused by a furnisher of information.  See 
Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 35 (1st 
Cir. 2010); Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 
1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009); Saunders v. Branch Banking & 
Trust Co. of Va., 526 F.3d 142, 149 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 
 Although a private citizen may bring an action under 
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), this cause of action is not without 
limitations.  The duties that are placed on furnishers of 
information by this subsection are implicated only “[a]fter 
receiving notice pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title of 
a dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any 
information provided by a person to a consumer reporting 
agency.”  15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1).  Notice under § 
                                              
1
 SimmsParris also appears to argue that 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) 
provides an independent basis of liability.  This section, 
however, merely limits when a plaintiff may bring certain 
state law claims, and does not provide any independent cause 
of action for a plaintiff seeking to enforce provisions of the 
FCRA. 
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1681i(a)(2) must be given by a credit reporting agency, and 
cannot come directly from the consumer.  See Chiang, 595 
F.3d at 35 n.8; Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154; Young v. Equifax 
Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 294 F.3d 631, 639 (5th Cir. 2002).  
  
SimmsParris argues that the District Court overly 
limited the cause of action contained in § 1681s-2(b) by 
requiring that a credit reporting agency be included “as one of 
the necessary players” in a private individual‟s claim.  JA 35.  
Asserting that this requirement is found nowhere in the 
FCRA, SimmsParris asks us to reverse the District Court‟s 
grant of summary judgment.  When interpreting a statute, 
such as the FCRA, we must turn first to the language of the 
statute itself.  “When the words of a statute are unambiguous, 
then, this first canon is also the last:  „judicial inquiry is 
complete.‟”  Conn. Nat‟l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 
(1992) (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 
(1981)).  In examining a particular provision of a statute, it is 
important to interpret it in the context of the full statutory 
scheme.  United Sav. Ass‟n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood 
Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).  “[T]he court will 
not look merely to a particular clause in which general words 
may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole 
statute . . . and give to it such a construction as will carry into 
execution the will of the Legislature.”  Kokoszka v. Belford, 
417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (quotation marks omitted).    
 
SimmsParris contends, in particular, that the required 
notice may come from any consumer reporting agency, and 
that it need not come from an agency to which the furnisher 
provided information.  We reject this contention, however, as 
unpersuasive both on structural and linguistic grounds.  First, 
the language that Congress used in 15 U.S.C. § 
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1681i(a)(2)(A) is helpful.  This subsection provides that “the 
agency shall provide notification of the dispute to any person 
who provided any item of information in dispute.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a)(2)(A).  The notice required in order to trigger the 
furnisher‟s duties under the statute does not come from “any” 
consumer reporting agency or “an” agency, but, rather, must 
come from “the” agency.  Given the context of the use of the 
word “the,” Congress could only have been referring to the 
“consumer reporting agency [that] receive[d] notice of a 
dispute from any consumer.”  Id. 
 
Second, the statute sets forth a framework under which 
the consumer reporting agency is the central focus of any 
private litigation.  See Chiang v. MBNA, 620 F.3d 30, 30 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (describing the consumer credit reporting agencies 
as playing the role of a “gatekeeper” under the statutory 
scheme).  Although consumer reporting agencies are subject 
to immediate suit by consumers under §§ 1681n and 1681o, 
furnishers of the information are not.  Instead, a private 
citizen wishing to bring an action against a furnisher must 
first file a dispute with the consumer reporting agency, which 
then must notify the furnisher of information that a dispute 
exists.  Only after this notification can the furnisher face any 
liability to a private individual.  To allow a consumer to 
bypass this structural framework by hiring a law firm that 
occasionally acts as a consumer reporting agency would 
interfere with this congressionally chosen path for creating 
liability.  In doing so, it would cause furnishers of 
information to have to respond directly to consumers rather 
than to reporting agencies, and would upset the balance 
enacted by the statute.  It would also have the perverse effect 
of making a consumer‟s ability to bring suit dependent upon 
the lawyer whom he or she retained.  
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Under the statutory framework and clear language of 
the statute, therefore, a consumer must first alert the credit 
reporting agency that reported the allegedly erroneous 
information of a dispute.  It is then up to the reporting agency 
to inform the furnisher of information that there has been a 
dispute, thereby triggering the furnisher‟s duty to investigate.  
It is only when the furnisher fails to undertake a reasonable 
investigation following such notice that it may become liable 
to a private litigant under § 1681s-2(b). 
 
 In the present case, SimmsParris did not comply with 
the statutory framework before bringing suit against CFC and 
CHL.  First, as noted above, she, along with all private 
litigants, is unable to maintain a cause of action under 15 
U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a).  Second, as she did not provide notice of 
a dispute prior to this suit to the consumer reporting agency 
that reported the information to which she objected, that 
agency could never provide notice to CFC or CHL pursuant 
to 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2), and in the absence of such notice, 
CFC and CHL were not obligated under the FCRA to 
undertake any investigation under § 1681s-2(b).  The District 
Court did not err in determining that a consumer reporting 
agency must be a “player” in any private cause of action 
brought against a furnisher of information pursuant to the 
FCRA insofar as it was noting that SimmsParris was required 
to provide notice of a dispute to the reporting agency that 
disseminated the allegedly false statement before maintaining 
suit under the FCRA.  Such a requirement is plain on the face 
of the statute, and the District Court did not err in granting 
summary judgment. 
 
 
 
10 
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
 
